David J. Hess, Science Studies: an advanced introduction

 

Chapter 1: “Science studies provides a conceptual tool kit for thinking about technical expertise in more sophisticated ways….and tracks the history of disciplines, the dynamics of science as a social institution, and the philosophical basis for scientific knowledge” (1).

 

Chapter 2: The Philosophy of Science

 

Hess provides a survey of some of the key concepts of science studies by reviewing the philosophy of science “through an interdisciplinary lens.” He begins by exploring the difference between the philosophy and social studies of science, which can be roughly categorized: philosophy is often prescriptive (tells science what it should do: “ought”); social studies is often descriptive (describes what science does: “is”). Ronald Giere: “philosophy is the study of how, a priori, an ideally logical scientist should think” (12). Hess will focus on the major type of prescription: how should scientists best choose among a number of competing theories?

 

The major positions:

 

Positivism

 

• Emerged from philosophy associated with the Vienna circle. (esp. Carnap) “I’m positive that I’m right because my position is based on science.”

• Used pejoratively by folks on the humanities side of the fence to mean an uncritical and simplistic view of science. Possibly could be extended to an uncritical acceptance of the authority of science?

• Key concept: verifiability principle: statements are meaningful if they are verifiable. This is in sharp contrast to what we call the “linguistic turn” in social studies (and the decline in hermeneutics in general?). Meaning is anchored in observation.

• Because of the nature of empirically-derived meaning, positivists drew a bold line between theory and observation, which leads to…

• Instrumentalism: theories are computational devices for predicting or explaining observable phenomena (as opposed to ontological realism: theoretical terms capture something of the deeper structures of reality).

• Justification: how a theory is correctly or erroneously related to a general set of principles. Also—how a particular belief is determined to be “within our intellectual rights as holding.” Plato’s definition of knowledge as “justified true belief”…we could munch on that for awhile…

• Philosophers see their work as concerned with the rationality of science (justification), as opposed to the work of social studies, which is often concerned with the arational aspects of science (i.e. the social) (discovery). Positivists see their work as outside of the influence of human history or culture.

• Induction: how to derive general empirical laws from observations

• Deduction: how to use general empirical laws to explain observations

• Induction is a messy beast: what do we do when we’ve induced two separate theories for the same data? What theory will we choose? Positivists will often turn to parsimony or the logic of Occam’s razor: the simplest is the best.

 

 

Interlude: Unity of science thesis

 

Suggests not only that different scientific disciplines should not be contradictory, but that philosophy of science in one field could be transported to another. Also suggested that the relations between the sciences could be put into a hierarchy by their reducibility. The smaller the particle, the better the science. This unity thesis served to further divide the natural/human sciences, because those sciences which study social phenomenon have a hard time reducing in the same way—laws which apply to the behavior of protons and electrons, for example, don’t quite explain the way that human beings behave. This may be the locus of the imbalance of cultural meaning between the two, often seen as gendered (hard/soft science). Idiographic science: studies historical particulars. Nomothetic science: search for general laws. Those in the social studies of science (SSS) suggest that this thesis is limited and quite counter-productive. (and, I’d wonder, what’s the point?)

 

Conventionalism

 

First major alternative to positivism. Attributed to Poincare or Duhem. Suggests that scientific laws and mathematical axioms are “disguised definitions or conventions.” Underdetermination: If a theory doesn’t fit the evidence, tweak it after the fact in order to protect it from refutation. Theory-ladenness: theories influence observations. Even though this is now well-accepted, it’s still not considered strong enough to prevent theory choice.

 

Falsification

 

Developed by Popper as a solution to the demarcation problem (how to tell science from nonscience: still very much an issue). Popper, often thought a positivist, was not a member of the Vienna circle and often at odds with Carnap. Strongly argued against induction—“I don’t know whether one additional observation will confirm or disconfirm the law, so I make another observation, and another…” (infinite regress). Popper thought induction was jumping to conclusions. Scientists don’t confirm laws or theories, just fail to falsify them. Still a positivist in many ways, committed to a rational science and to justification anchored in empiricism. Also—may have worked for some natural sciences, but still too narrow and predictive for something like social science.

 

Historicism

 

Kuhn. Advocated using historical facts in developing philosophical theories. Made Popper and Carnap seem like good buddies. STS began to see Kuhn’s work as rather conservative, since it still basically continued, rather than challenged fundamental theories in the philosophy of science. Kuhn’s work in a micro-nutshell: scientific revolution, controversies, normal science (shouldn’t NS come before controversy?)

Kuhn’s main term, paradigm suffered from much ambiguity (and still does!) and he later revised the idea as disciplinary matrix. The other important Kuhnian term: anomaly: an repeated inconsistency that provokes a revolution.

 

Scientific progress replacing one theory with a better one (better problem-solving ability--Laudan). Hess also finds this definition too narrow, and suggests that social studies can contribute much to this understanding of scientific progress.

 

Naturalism

 

All human activities can be understood as entirely natural phenomena, as are the activities of chemicals or animals.

 

Realism

 

Preference would be a criterion that uses terms that are more realistic (i.e. more observational terms) or become more observational over time (or with more technology, I’d say—more advanced ways of “seeing”).

 

1. ontological: theories are either true or false “in virtue of how the world is” (seek to better define the real world)

2. causal: “the theoretical terms of the theory denote theoretical entities which are causally responsible for the observable phenomena”

3. epistemological: “we can have a warranted belief in theories or in entities (at least in principle)”.

 

Constructivism

 

Often described as social idealism in which there is no material reality that constrains or structures sensory observations. Scientists impose structure on or “make” the world.

 

Cultural constructivism: scientific theories are realistic maps or explanations of a real world and at the same time vehicles that encode culture-bound linguistic categories and cultural values.

 

Social constructivism: … are shaped by social interests and other social variables. This is a more moderate constructivism—believes that sci. theories and observations are constrained by a real, material world, but not completely so.

Conservative constructivism: social interests and cultural values shape sci. theories only by instilling bias. Eventually that bias can be removed to reveal…objective science! Hess advocates a moderate constructivism.

 

 

Relativism

 

Cultural relativism: a research stance that begins with some social unit: starts with local meanings, which are then explained by general theories available in the social sciences.

 

Epistemological relativism: 1. evidence and other universalistic criteria (such as consistency) do not play a crucial role in theory choice, which is instead largely conditioned by contingent or particularistic social factors and 2) attempts to articulate prescriptive theory choice criteria are useless because scientists will not follow them.

 

Metapyhysical (ontological) relativism: theories and theoretical language do not necessarily capture anything of the deep structure of reality behind observations

 

Moral relativism: there should be no universally upheld values – tends to be conflated problematically with the others…

 

Universalistic values

 

 

Particularistic values:

 

Scientists are much more particularistic than they may admit to in public (40). Hess breaks down into a few different overlapping categories: favoritism (friend or enemy?), social prejudice (person is a member of “x” category that I like or dislike), cognitive cronyism or cognitive particularism (are they in or outside my area of expertise? – I’d extend this to allegiances to particular research methods, because one often has a strong professional interest in the furthering of one’s own research method), personal gain (career, funding, etc.), reputation (person occupies x position in the hierarchy)

 

Hess prefers to discuss the problems involved in theory choice between these two categories because it is more clear than categories such as rational (cognitive) versus social (the division of which is often blurred and complicated).

 

Feminist Epistemologies

 

Feminist theories of science may offer a prescriptive theory choice scenario based on particularistic values. Examples: standpoint epistemology (perspectives of marginalized groups), strong objectivity, situated knowledges. These starting points, Hess claims, are still in the process of development and may not be applicable to different fields of scientific inquiry. Feminist frameworks need to be “embedded in an overall theory of justification if they are to avoid the problem of epistemological relativism.” (i.e. that the research they offer does not stop with the perspective of marginalized groups).

 

Helen Longino’s six criteria for theory or research choice:

empirical adequacy (like, but not necessarily the same as Kuhn’s “accuracy”), novelty (calls for knowledges situated from historically excluded standpoints) ontological heterogeneity (concern with diversity in the object of study and a rejection of theories that see difference as substandard),

complexity of relationship (reject single-factor causal models in favor of those that incorporate dynamic interaction)

applicability to human needs (how will science benefit the conditions of human life)

diffusion of power (choose research that favors programs less limiting in terms of access and participation)

 

 

ISS developed from the sociology of occupations, and resisted the idea that it should have to have an intimate understanding of scientific content in order to do good work.

 

Norms

 

Formulated after the work of American sociologist Robert Merton. Now really only useful as a prescription for the ideal behavior of scientists, ala universalistic values.

 

Merton’s norms:

 

1. universalism: truth claims should be subjected to preestablished, impersonal justification criteria that excludes consideration of particularistic criteria

2. communism: the findings of science constitute a common heritage to be shared with the whole community

3. disinterestedness: scientists must subject their work to rigorous scrutiny

4. organized skepticism: scientists should engage in the “detached scrutiny of beliefs” free from the influence of outside factors, like religion or politics

 

Folks in the ISS started moving away from Merton’s norms after research failed to confirm them. They started moving toward the analysis of status attainment and stratification after a key work by Ben-David suggested that norms of individualism and independence were more salient than Merton’s norms. Does move us into an interesting question about the autonomy of science (always a pertinent question!) from things like politics, religion, and corporate interest, however…

 

Stratification Studies I: Cumulative Advantage Theory

 

How do scientists achieve status? Early career success tends to allow scientists to accrue recognition and resources that, in an increasing returns pattern mediated by higher productivity, lead to even greater recognition and access to resources. Non-universalistic practice in action, which represents a departure from the ideal.

 

Matthew Effect: advantage conferred on a scientist by virtue of having a superior institutional location.

 

Matilda Effect: the disadvantage of women in the history of science—often denied credit or ignored altogether (Rosalind Franklin)

 

These studies help to explain the disparities in science from funding to placement for people in marginalized groups.

 

Stratification Studies II: Evaluation

 

Gatekeeping: a general evaluative process that also helps to explain disparities in scientific status for marginalized groups.

 

Other ISS areas of research

 

Innovation and productivity (role of age, family factors, mentor relationships, group size, etc.)

“Invisible colleges” areas outside the discipline and laboratory that also contribute to scientific work

citation studies and bibliometrics (measure of patterns in written communication): qualitative method of evaluating scientists’ status by virtue of citation and publication rates. The number of publications is often not a reliable predictor of a person’s status in the field—many other factors (multiple authorship, resources, “salami slicing,” research quality, etc.) need to be taken into account. The research front: a small number of publications that moves forward and packs old research down into the archive where it is obliterated/incorporated into the field’s research.

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Chapter Four: Social Studies of Scientific Knowledge

 

• methodological internalism (Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay) (81)

 

• opening the black box / a black box (81)

 

• types of constructivism: (82-83)

--conservative, moderate, and radical (chapter 2)

--social constructivism: studies that treat the social world as an exogenous, independent variable that shapes or causes some aspect of the content of science and technology

--heterogeneous constructivism: holds that content of science and technology is constructed along with the social relations and structures in the wider society: seamless web of coconstituion.

-- cultural constructivism: framework for empirical research that interprets the cultural meaning and cultural politics of different scientific theories, observations and methods; begins with the question of meaning from actors’ point of view; draws on semiotics, feminism and cultural anthropology

 

• conflict sociology of science (85)

 

• the “weak program” of SSK (Chubin and Restivo) (86)

 

• the “strong program” or Edinburgh School of SSK (Bloor et. al.) (86-89)

--causality

--impartiality

--symmetry

--reflexivity (the tu quoque argument; the ‘socially positioned actors’ approach Haraway, Martin

 

• interests analysis (cognitive or technical / social/ attributed interests (90-93)

--imputation problem

--interest dopes

--interests as consequence rather than cause of scientists’ actions

* cultural domain

* analysis of role of interests in closure of a controversy

--Gibson’s law “for every PhD. there is an equal and opposite Ph.D.” (94)

-- smokescreen effect Robert Proctor (95)

 

• Bath School (Harry Collins): microsociological processes in controversies: EPOR / SCOT (84-5)

--constitutive form vs. contingent forum (95)

--ambiguity of replication

--‘enculturational model’

--experimenter’s regress

 

• Description of closure mechanisms and sanitization strategy Engelhardt and Caplan; Beder; Wallis (999-100)

 

• Laboratory Studies (100)

--indexicality (Knorr-Cetina) (101)

• local variations in research decision criteria

* situational contingency / tinkering

--networks as focal social units of science studies

--notion of fact construction: key conceptual contribution of laboratory studies (101)

--5 types of facts (Latour & Woolgar) (101-102)

1. conjectures or speculatiosn

2. statements that contain modalities that refer to evidence or lack thereof

3. claims of research finding attached to researchers

4. claims of generally accepted knowledge (textbooks, still referenced)

5. taken-for-granted common knowledge not needing references

--black boxing (when facts become inscribed in taken-for-granted technologies) (102)

--Susan Leigh Star: typology of mechanisms for process of transformation from ‘local uncertainties’ to ‘global certainties’:

* attributing certainty to results of other fields

* substituting processual for production evaluations in face of technical failures

* ideal type substitutions

* shifting clinical and basic evaluation criteria

* ad hoc generalizing of case studies

* subsuming epistemological questions in internal debates

--ethnomethodology and discourse analysis: laboratory studies focused on fine-grained analyses of scientists conversations and accounts of their work

 

--triangulation of three elements in scientific research (Pickering) (104)

* material procedure

* interpretive model

* phenomenal model

 

--Social worlds theory: emphasis on practice and work (Clarke, Fujimura, Star)(105)

* analysis of ‘doable’ problems in science

* boundary objects: scientific objects that inhabit several intersecting social worlds

*scientific bandwagon: when large numbers of people, laboratories, and organizations commit their resources to a problem

 

--Strength of SSK: insights into particularistic values and local contingencies in production of scientific knowledge; new vocabulary for conceptualizing aspects of construction process (105)

--Weakness of SSK: ignores macrosociological issues : class, the state, race, gender, colonialism, historical transformations

 

--Network theories (106) Attempts to think about the social units of science beyond formal organizational terms such as laboratories, departments, research institutions, and disciplines.

--actor-network theory (Callon, Latour; Law)

principle of extended symmetry: treat social agents, objects, and texts as ‘entities’ on the same level in a heterogenous sociotechnical network. (Foucault/ Haraway)

--calls for a new sociology that follows the attribution of agency: actants: any entity endowed with an ability to act or whoever or whatever is represented.

--representations: designation of someone or something as a spokesperson for an actant (person, object, institution, network)

--focus: how things are endowed with an ability to influence human action through delegation or representation

--sociology of translation the general framework: the means by which one entity gives a role to others, in four ‘moments’: problematization, interessement, enrollment, and mobilization (109)

 

--Strength of actor-network theory: lucid explanation of why winners win and would-be winners lose.

--Weakness: doesn’t explain why some actors are excluded from the game, why the playing field isn’t level. (Leaves out categories such as race, class, gender, colonialism, and industrial interests); tends to explain social action instrumentally

 

--Hess’s prescription:

“social studies of scientific knowledge needs to move in a different direction that grants power and culture a more prominent role: power as it is embedded in historical structures of class, race, gender, and so forth, and culture as a contested system of meanings for actors.” (111)

 

Chapter Five: Critical and Cultural Studies of Science and Technology

 

--Different types of cultural studies:

* British (Birmingham school): theoretical frameworks drawing on Marxism, semiotics and feminism; focusing on contemporary popular culture, subcultures and mass media; offering a range of social science and humanities methods; offering a politically engaged perspective

* North American: draws on language theory, concerned with feminist, queer, antiracist and postcolonial identity issues, and is dominated by humanities scholars in literature and film studies and women’s studies & other interdisciplinary departments

* Cultural studies of science and technology:

--more reliance on social theory. feminist and queer theory, fieldwork, ethnographic interviews and archival research;

--tendency to focus on questions of culture and power; to problematize contemporary science and technology historically as part of the postmodern condition; to examine how nonexperts and historically excluded groups reconstruct science and technology, and to forge alliances between researchers and activist/ interventionist social agendas.

 

--distinction between two meanings of “Critical Theory”:

• humanities: theory of literary or cultural criticism;
• social sciences: Western Marxist tradition associated with Frankfurt School and post-Marxist researchers, eg; Habermas
• STS: confluence of research traditions including feminist / anti-racist studies; critics of technological society; radical social researchers; scholars concerned with social justice and democracy

 

--Frankfurt School concepts that have influenced science studies (114-5)

* reification: in science studies: how general cultural values can come to be seen as natural after they have been encoded in scientific representations

* hegemony: concept that explains the process by which the ruling classes support creation and diffusion of a general system of values and ideas that percolates through major institutions of society (while allowing other beliefs and value systems to exist hence maintaining an illusion of democratic pluralism) thus ensuring that critics are marginalized and ineffective

* ideology: discourses or systems of ideas considered in their cultural / political dimension

--Foucault’s theorizing of knowledge and power as basis for ideology analysisL116-118)

* episteme: epistemological grid that unites “discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, science, and possibly formalized systems” (116)

* apparatus: heterogenous ensemble of elements including discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions—the said as much as the unsaid. like the STS concept of heterogeneous networks

* capillary power: normalization and surveillance rather than repression

--disciplinary technologies

--biopower

--regimentation of social body and individual body

 

--Pierre Bourdieu (118-9)

* symbolic capital: (influence on Latour & Woolgar’s work on analysis of cycles of credit)

* doxa: presuppositions that opponents in a controversy disregard as self-0evident and hence beyond dispute

--Concepts from Feminism and Antiracist theory (119-123)

* gender

* androcentrism, sexism, misogyny

* essentialism

* oppositional practices and groups (counterhegemonic movements and practices)

* Haraway’s theory of scientific change including heterogeneous network building work of actor-network theorists, collective undertaking of destabilization of normal science; rightness of whole social moment (cultural contexts of historical processes)

 

• race and gender in science: incoherence of race as biological concept; environmental racism; environmental justice

1. analysis of how social and economic justice issues are made invisible and uncontestable by translating them into technical discourse

2. understanding resistance technology, and the dumping of unwanted technologies on poor communities and countries

 

--Critical and Feminist Technology Studies

*Mumford: authoritarian vs. democratic technics

* Mauss, Ellul: technique—“a rationalizing technical principle as distinguished from the machine or technology per se” with the end result of the iron cage of rationalization, & the technological society (Weber)

* technological fix: attempt to find a technological solution to a social and/or political problem

* technological determinism

* autonomous technology

• Winner: the build-in politics of artifacts (thus limiting interpretive flexibility) (125)
• technological regularization
• appropriate technology movement
• green technologies or sustainable technology
• dual use technology (applications in both civilian and military sectors)
• technology that deskills workers (Braverman / Noble)
• reproductive technologies: issue of entrepreneurial culture of choice; issue of commodification

 

--Concepts from the History of Science:

* concept of whig history: premature and postmature discoveries / presentism / internalism vs. externalism

* analysis of scientific revolution: roots in modernity (Merton, Weber), Shapin and Shaffer (laboratory as social space, experiment), Jacob (social framing)

* problem of periodization in science: meaning of “modernity”; modernism; postmodernism (131-2); post-Fordist

* Haraway: cyborg, implosion

* Rabinow: biosociality

--Concepts from Anthropology:

• enthnography: laboratory studies

--arena (Traweek)

--anthropological concept of culture: total learned knowledge, beliefs, and practices (cs. and ucs.) of a social unit ranging from multinational regions to microsociological unites (136)

--empirical work beginning from perspective of communities; focused on ritual and material culture

 

--Structuralism and Poststructuralism (138-141)

* emic and etic

* totemism and technototems

* reconstruction: process by which new social groups in expert communities challenge existing theories and methods

* bricolage

* logic of the concrete

*deconstruction: encompassing term and supplementary term (140)

* master molecule theory

--Public Understanding of Science and Technology (141)

* field studies

* the conjuring of scientific authority

* study of scientific and technical controversies: fetal research, animal rights, ozone depletion, nuclear energy, creation science (Nelkin, 142)

* development sciences

* ethnosciences

 

--Rethinking Values: comparative perspective (146-7)

 

CONCLUSION

What good is science studies, technology studies, or STS as a whole?

1. give appreciation of history (HSTS: hooray for science and technology school, Winner)

2. scientiometric study of science (MSTS: managing science, technology and society)

3. make potential for conflict explicit: define STS in terms of widespread public concern with science, technology and values: badly needed site where people concerned with place of science and technology in democratic society can debate such complicated issues as:

* internal institutional dynamics of science

* general place of science and technology in society

4. Translate general question of a concern with values into concrete research agendas:

* different kinds of policy studies

* intervention into the ‘content’ of science or knowledge-making process itself

--by scientists (use SSK research as resource for strategies)

--by lay citizens (citizen review panels, develop mechanisms to produce alternative scientific interpretations)

--“partner theorizing”

--Dutch model of “science shops”

 

--Aspects of a Postconstructivist Science Studies m(alternative analytical framework)

1. analysis is political

2. analysis is cultural

3. analysis is evaluative (draws on philosophy of science)

4. analysis is positioned (positioned inside the controversy)